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STATE OF INDIAN…

August 13, 2012
STATE OF INDIANA                                                                 IN THE WHITLEY SUPERIOR COURT
COUNTY OF WHITLEY
 
Michael-Lynn goble, Plaintiff
 
v.
 
US BANK
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and                                                  Jury Demanded
 
FIVE BROTHER MORTGAGES SERVICES AND SERVICING, INC
Warren, Michigan; and
 
MICHAEL D. HOLLINGSWORTH
Parker City, Indiana; and
 
CHAD JONES
Parker City, Indiana; and
 
MATTHEW RENTSCHLER
Columbia City, Indiana 46725                                                CAUSE NO. ____-____-PL-______
 
 
COMPLAINT
 
Verified Complaint for Trespass, Conversion, Racketeering, Fraud and Gross Negligence and Theft and Wrongful Eviction Against US BANK/BANCORP and FIVE BROTHERS MORTGAGE SERVICING AND SERVICE, INC. and Vendor/Property Preservation agents thereof: CHAD JONES and MICHAEL D. HOLLINGSWORTH and MATTHEW RENTSCHLER, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY or Individually WITH PRE-JUDGEMENT INTEREST and POST-JUDGEMENT INTEREST
 
The undersigned Plaintiff, Michael-Lynn goble, having reason to believe, now declares subject to the penalties for perjury, that the following statements and representations are true to the best of his knowledge and reason to believe:
Factual Background of the Case and Basis in Law and Jurisdiction of the Court

1.    During the 2009 Legislative Session of the United Stated Congress, said Congress Enacted (H.R. 4173), as part of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and CONSUMER PROTECTIONS ACT, certain black letter law provisions titled: Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 as part of Pub. L 111-5, that became effective when then signed into Law by President Barack Obama on May 20, 2009, as the “sunset” was thus extended (Section 1484) later by Amendment to be effective until December 31, 2014 as a new expiration date. Said Act was legislated as a means to protect tenants from abuse of Banks and Servicers and Property Preservation Vendors and subsequent owners after sheriff sale, due to the plethora of abuses suffered by tenants living in properties in which foreclosure was initiated against landlords as owners of properties being rented and occupied by tenants, otherwise deprived of due process, in disregard of State law, such as IC 32-31, et seq. which said act overrides or supercedes, in part or in whole, said Laws of every State providing less protections and Right to continue the tenancy; to protect the Rights of Tenants in every State of The Union, having the expectation of peaceful enjoyment of the premises as Tenants, whether as Tenants by leasehold or by month to month Tenancy.
 
2.    DEFENDANTS: CHAD JONES, on the date of September 29. 2010, at about 10AM, committed the offense of Trespass, while aided and abetted by several employed members of the Columbia City Police Department and forcibly evicted Tenant by means of changing of locks and nailing windows shut; locking Tenant out of the Tenant’s home without prior Notice whatsoever, written or otherwise. DEFENDANT: MICHAEL D. HOLLINGSWORTH, may or may not have been present on this date at the premises, as employer of CHAD JONES, working as an employee of MICHAEL D. HOLLINGSWORTH, although DEFENDANT: CHAD JONES, living just a short distance from the residence of MICHAEL D. HOLLINGSWORTH, near Parker City, Indiana, is a tattoo artist by regular occupation and inexperienced to be left unsupervised as to matters of Tenant Rights and due process, so as not to knowingly and intentionally commit criminal offenses as herein enumerated or denominated as cause for damages. Present on said date were several other male individuals that arrived with a pickup truck and trailers as evident in pictures then taken by the Plaintiff, that remain unknown and which are also potential defendants, which discovery contemplates will reveal their individual identities and liabilities, such as justify an answer and defense when later served by Process and or compel their attendance in court by means of Subpoena as witnesses.
 
3.    DEFENDANT: US BANK/BANCORP, by relationship as Principle to Agent/DEFENDANT: FIVE BROTHERS MORTGAGE SERVICING AND SERVICES, INC, had knowledge of the presence of the Plaintiff as occupant of the premises, inasmuch as CHAD JONES phoned DEFENDANT FIVE BROTHERS and or DEFENDANT MICHAEL D. HOLLINGSWORTH, to seek advice on how to proceed, and all said defendants, did disregard the fact that an unidentified female agent of the DEFENDANT/SERVICER: FIVE BROTHERS MORTGAGE SERVICING AND SERVICES, INC, had on at least one occasion previously and most recently again on the date of September 29, 2010, placed another red door hanger at the premises of 526 East Jackson Street, Columbia City, Indiana and at such recent event and time, said Agent, also did personally speak face to face in the back yard of the premises with the Tenant at approximately 9AM, at which event said Agent acknowledged the presence of the Tenant as a Tenant and requested this Plaintiff to let the landlord know about the red hanger. See appended herewith the original Red Tag received by this Plaintiff/Tenant from this “Verification Specialist”/Agent, sent to the property to determine if the premises were vacant or occupied.
 
4.    Despite the eye witness observations of the unknown female Agent (Paragraph “3.”) about an hour before the lockout of the Plaintiff that the utilities were connected and billed to the name of the Tenant, either DEFENDANT CHAD JONES or MICHAEL D. HOLLINGSWORTH, subsequently went into the office of the Columbia City Clerk/Department of Utilities and without documentation of new ownership or change of tenancy, had all utilities disconnected on the date of September 30, 2010, resulting in the loss to the Plaintiff of the $500.00 worth of contents of the refrigerator and freezer situated in the kitchen area of the home, or household of the Tenant.
 
5.    After being locked out of the premises, Plaintiff/Tenant, went to the Office of the Circuit Court in Whitley County, located on the third floor of the Whitley County Courthouse and researched the file in Cause No. ____________ wherein DEFENDANT US BANK is Plaintiff and this Plaintiff/Tenant confirmed, by an examination of the Chronological Case Summary and the complete file contents, the fact that this Plaintiff/Tenant was never provided any due process as Tenant of the property, as likewise the prior Tenant, known to this undersigned Plaintiff as “Jeremy”, was also never served with process by the DEFENDANT US BANK/BANCORP, as parties “with interest” in the premises/property/foreclosure proceedings as would be required by IC 32-31, et seq. and PTFA, for due process and right to be heard and rights protected by the court, as a person with interest in the property is not subject to trespass, such as this Plaintiff/Tenant was so arrested twice with charges later dismissed after this Plaintiff/Tenant finally, after remaining in custody for about six weeks in the Whitley County Jail made bail and three days before jury trial the charges were dropped by reason of evidence of the fact that the utilities were in the name of this Plaintiff/Tenant at the time of the lock out and trespass and wrongful eviction on September 29, 2010.
 
6.    About five months after the trespass and lockout and eviction of this Plaintiff/Tenant, a Sheriff Sale of the premises was held, inasmuch as on the date of September 30, 2010, DEFENDANT: US BANK/BANCORP, in this Cause of Action, but as Plaintiff in Cause No. 92C01-____-MF-_____ obtained an Order of Decree of Foreclosure and said DEFENDANT subsequently became the new owner of record by reason of Sheriff Deed, after bidding It’s Judgment amount at the public auction and no one otherwise bidding more than US BANK/BANCORP.
 
7.    This Plaintiff/Tenant, under duress of threat and experiencing intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress and injury to liberty by actual arrest for trespass, never willingly abandoned the property and never willingly abandoned any of the personality situated on the premises, during the interval of time between the lockout date and the sale date of the property that resulted in a Sheriff Deed and title transfer, or change of ownership to DEFENDANT US BANK/BANCORP.
 
8.    Fact of evidence of phone records is obdurate proof of fact that this Plaintiff/Tenant made repeated phone during above said “interval” and subsequent dates thereto, to the phone number posted at the premises by DEFENDANTS: CHAD JONES and or MICHAEL D. HOLLINGSWORTH, as otherwise provided to the this Plaintiff/Tenant on the date of the lockout, that is the phone number for DEFENDANT FIVE BROTHERS MORTGAGE SERVICES AND SERVICING, INC., but was all times disregarded and denied access to perform removal of personality never abandoned by this Plaintiff/Tenant.
 
9.    This Plaintiff/Tenant also, as well, made phone calls to the Kentucky office and the Legal Department in Minnesota of DEFENDANT US BANK/BANCORP, as well as emails this Plaintiff/Tenant sent to the Office of CEO/President of US BANK/BANCORP, but despite all this Notice of the Tenancy and Rights under Law asserted by this Plaintiff/Tenant, this Plaintiff/Tenant was repeatedly denied keys to access the premises and was deprived of the Right to remove any personality not owned by any of the DEFENDANTS and or Agents of these said Defendants, as contracted or employed and converting such personality without permission of this Plaintiff/Agent, as later conducted as additional criminal offenses some several weeks after the Sale and later occurred during a subsequent week that this Plaintiff/Tenant was present near the premises, as were many friends and neighboring property owners to witness DEFENDANTS/VENDOR employees removing all such personality from the barred premises, even as this Plaintiff/Tenant was then and there reporting the theft to the Columbia City Police Department and otherwise taking pictures of vehicles and individuals present at the premises and removing personality of the household of this Plaintiff/Tenant from the premises several weeks after the Sheriff Sale at auction that only then vested title and ownership to DEFENDANT US BANK/BANCORP.
 
10.    As a matter of Record and obdurate fact of such evidence, said Record of CAD #_________ is proof that DEFENDANT CHAD JONES, did misinform personnel within the employment of the Columbia City Police Department  on the date of September 29, 2010, that DEFENDANT US BANK/BANCORP was the actual owner of the property, contrary to public record within purview of the Office of Prosecutor of Whitley County and Prosecutor Matthew Rentschler, advising said Authority/Officers and not performing a judicial function that is immune from prosecution and all said also ignoring the rent receipt then known to them to exist as shown previously during a prior investigation at the premises and on file with the Clerk, as attached hereto, or as stated to this Plaintiff/Tenant by one of the said employees and said DEFENDANT, during the time that law enforcement arrived to aid and abet all DEFENDANTS in the wrongful eviction while committing trespass and entities implicated in the offense of racketeering and limiting this Plaintiff to only 10 minutes to collect belongings and get off the property, which was only time enough for this Plaintiff/Tenant to collect three cats and a jacket and a laptop computer, that this Plaintiff/Tenant loaded onto a Honda Moped and bike trailer and this Plaintiff/Tenant suffering the resulting loss of other cats left locked inside the house for at least 8 days by the DEFENDANTS, without water or food, in their neglect and abuse of these animals, before such abused and neglected animals managed to escape out of a poorly fitted board placed over a broke basement window as fastened improperly by DEFENDANTS on such date.
 
11.    This Plaintiff/Tenant has also suffered resulting loss of such personality identified in paragraph “10.”, excepting the three cats, as these items and other personality, as eventually reported stolen by this Plaintiff/Tenant after release from jail upon bail, was later stolen during the six weeks of custody that deprived this Plaintiff/Tenant of such property as a consequence of a false arrest, that during custody, prevented this Plaintiff/Tenant from securing such property from theft as situated only a block distance from the jail on a public parking lot and having a combined value of at least $1,000.00 in addition to the total value of all other personality removed and converted or stolen amounting to at least $30,000.00, even after this Plaintiff/Tenant personally delivered copies of PTFA and case law, in person or by means of mail of PTFA to all DEFENDANTS and others as implicated by name or not specifically named, as accomplices to the crimes herein complained by this Plaintiff/Tenant. This Plaintiff/Tenant has a prepared list of all personality such as, but not limited in the least to more than 5 dozen of musical instruments, several amplifiers and speakers and clothing and hardware and tools and more than two dozen bicycles and three mopeds and one zero turn mower and exotic hardwood lumber and non ferrous metal pipes and three dozen plus televisions and two karaoke systems and numerous pieces photographic equipment and irreplaceable family heirlooms and pictures and mementos and numerous various antiques and cds and dvds and vhs collections and food and more than 700 hundred articles of clothing saved for relief of victims of disaster relief stolen and or carelessly discarded as trash by these DEFENDANTS.

12.    Authority in part for this Lawsuit is based upon Indiana Code 34-24-3-3, as remedy for some, if not all of the crimes committed by the various DEFENDANTS, for the injuries this Plaintiff/Tenant has suffered, as a consequence of the Trespass, Conversion, Racketeering, Invasion of Privacy and False Arrest committed against the Rights of the Plaintiff/Tenant under Indiana Law for said crimes as promulgated and codified and under the private right of action of PTFA.

13.    As in the recently decided Appeal of ___________________, this Plaintiff/Tenant, although unable to provide a written lease copy due to the behavior of the DEFENDANTS that have deprived the Plaintiff/Tenant of the important legal papers in files in the house, concerning the lease for years with more than two years remaining, the lease subject to renewal upon 90 day written notice before June 30, 2013 and not terminable at will, to extend for an additional two years and likewise renewable upon 90 day written notice, is to be honored by the new owner, if not an occupying owner, as all buyers are “subject to” tenancy and terms of the lease by the occupying Tenant, as in this case when DEFENDANT US BANK/BANCORP, only having a security interest prior to the Sheriff Sale, had no ownership of the property until some five months after the lockout of this Plaintiff/Tenant, when USBANK/BANCORP eventually obtained title and ownership much later when the Landlord and Owner of Record named Greg Needler forfeited title and ownership of the premises to US BANK/BANCORP, by said Landlord/Owner not outbidding US BANK/BANCORP or said Landlord/Owner not paying the judgment amount before the auction and sale of the property.

14.    This Plaintiff/Tenant, as any one, that has suffered the abuse of trespass and invasion of privacy and theft, has none the less and without a doubt suffered the extreme mental anguish and or extreme emotional distress knowingly inflicted by the DEFENDANTS, as all did disregard the apparent if not obvious occupancy of this premise by this Plaintiff/Tenant, especially as concerns the abuse and neglect of the 8 felines locked inside and carelessly uncared for by any of the DEFENDANTS; and it is absolutely reasonable to award punitive damages for such suffering, as endured for many months by this Plaintiff/Tenant, even though this impoverished Plaintiff/Tenant, that is legally blind and on public assistance, sought no counseling and took no medications to calm the nerves and relieve the stress.

15.    When the Agents acted on behave of the Principles and US BANK/BANCORP, representing to Police that US BANK/BANCORP was the owner and proceeded to lock out the Plaintiff/Tenant from the premises without Court Order for Eviction by means of a change of locks, the change of locks was done contrary to the prohibition against such act, as provided in Indiana Code 32-31-6(C)(1) and DEFENDANTS illegally locked Plaintiff/Tenant out of the premises, in as much as US BANK/BANCORP, as said “owner”, would also be the Landlord in relationship to the  Plaintiff/Tenant, as the observed occupant of the premises, observed by all the witnesses then present.

16.    When the Agents acted on behave of the Principles and US BANK/BANCORP, representing to Police that US BANK/BANCORP was the “owner” and proceeded to have the Clerk to disconnect all the utilities at the premises billed in the name of the Plaintiff/Tenant, such disconnection of all of the utilities billed in the name of the Plaintiff/Tenant was done contrary to the prohibition against such act, as provided in Indiana Code 32-31 ____ and DEFENDANTS illegally disconnected all the utilities billed in the name of the Plaintiff/Tenant residing at the premises, in as much as US BANK/BANCORP as said “owner” would also be the Landlord in relationship to the  Plaintiff/Tenant, as the observed occupant of the premises; observed by all the witnesses then present.

17.    When the Agents some five months later, acted without Order of “abandonment” from the Court and without any Notice whatsoever to the Plaintiff/Tenant as mandated by IC 32-31-4-2(d)(3), personality that was absolutely not voluntarily abandoned by the Plaintiff/Tenant was none the less removed from the property on behave of the Principles and US BANK/BANCORP, thereby converting same and committing the offense of theft, in as much as US BANK/BANCORP as said “owner” would also be the Landlord in relationship to the  Plaintiff/Tenant, as the observed occupant of the premises; observed by all the witnesses then present.

18.    As provided in Indiana Code 32-31-4-1(f) and (g)(2), US BANK/BANCORP as claimed “owner”, as then asserted on the day of the change of locks, by representation of the Agents of US BANK/BANCORP to the Police,  DEFENDANTS illegally deprived the Plaintiff/Tenant of the “right of access” under IC 32-31-5-5, in the absence of any “emergency” of IC 32-31-6(c)(A)(B) and (C) and of a weeks supply of clothing.

19.   The combined actions of the DEFENDANTS as Principals and or as Agents of Principals, was all conducted contrary to the “obligations of a Landlord” as provided by and specifying certain prohibitions as stated therein IC 32-31-8, et seq..

20.    That the DEFENDANTS, One and or All acted with malice of forethought to commit Fraud against the Rights of the Plaintiff/Tenant, as Defendants/Agents Chad Jones and or Michael D. Hollingsworth falsely informed Police concerning ownership of the property by the secured interest when the property was obviously and without a doubt occupied as evident by the presence of all the personality located inside and outside the house and cats inside and outside the house and utilities connected and in the name of the Plaintiff/Tenant and yet regardless of all the evidence then seen to exist disregarded what a prudent man would have considered reason to cease and desist all activities without court order for eviction and in doing so did severely oppress the peaceful enjoyment of the Plaintiff/Tenant.

21.    DEFENDANT: Matthew Rentschler as an attorney to whom the police turned for advice and advising the police to arrest the Plaintiff/Tenant did advise the police while not involved in a judicial conduct but rather in an administrative act which is not immune from suit and had Matthew Rentschler done due diligence to find out why the utilities were in the name of the Plaintiff/Tenant and observed the copy of a rental payment receipt signed by the Landlord as shown many months before to police by the Plaintiff/Tenant and had Matthew Rentschler been up to date on protections provided to the Plaintiff and the superceding Law of PTFA, such prudent investigation and due diligence would have provided reason for Matthew Rentschler to otherwise advise the police to not arrest the Plaintiff and advise the police to arrest the DEFENDANTS: Michael D. Hollingsworth for the crimes of trespass and or invasion of privacy and or theft and or falsely informing the police on the date of September 29, 2010 and later during the week of removal after US BANK/BANCORP became the holder of a Sheriff Deed and title to the property and actual owner; and the Plaintiff filed another criminal complaint with the police, but police would not protect the personality of the Plaintiff even then, even after the Plaintiff had delivered copies of PTFA to the office of the Matthew Rentschler and Mike _______ that is Captain of the Columbia City Police Department and Matthew Rentschler was aware of the evidence of the tenancy of this Plaintiff/Tenant so as to dismiss the charges for trespass due to the apparent “contract interest” as recognized within the Criminal Trespass Statute.

To avoid redundancy the Plaintiff now incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as if set forth verbatim herein and continues with these statements and claims for damages without further incorporation of this statement as applies hereafter and throughout:

23.    Each of the named DEFENDANTS in this matter owed various duties to this Plaintiff, including but not limited to the following duties:

a.)    DEFENDANTS had common law duties based on the relationship created between the contract between Landlord and Plaintiff/Tenant and the contract mortgage terms requiring timely written notices and other documents entered into by the parties, including the lease paid in advance by the tenant to the landlord for fair market value compensation.

b.)    DEFENDANTS had common law duties to prevent injury and harm, and to use ordinary care as a prudent person should such as to avoid harm to the Plaintiff’s person and property (personality); and duties duties to exercise reasonable care in performing services that would recognize and or impact upon the Plaintiff as Tenant are necessary for the protection of person and property as a matter of due diligence to determine the rights of the Plaintiff to occupy the property in peaceful enjoyment thereof as Tenant; and

c.)    DEFENDANTS: US BANK/BANCORP and FIVE BROTHERS MORTGAGE SERVICES AND SERVICING, INC. and Attorney MATTHEW RENTSCHLER, as sophisticated ENTITIES, in the relationship with the Vendors, not known to be licensed professionals and having little if any knowledge of law in this activity as MATTHEW RENTSCHLER, similarly owned duties to prevent injury and harm, and to use ordinary care such as to avoid harm to person and property; and duties to exercise reasonable restraint in addition to care in performing services that would require a certain learned amount of legal understanding and or legal advise from an attorney before proceeding, that would recognize necessary for the protection of person and property.

24.    As outlined in the “Facts” section, herein, DEFENDANTS each breached, one or more of these various duties by inducing Vendor to illegally lockout the Tenant and/or wrongfully evict the Plaintiff/Tenant without due process of Order of the Court or any prior written notice(s) as mandated by Federal Law and or Indiana State Law as herein cited and printed verbatim as reproduced for clarification of terms and processes and meanings of words thus defined in usage throughout this Complaint/Suit; wrongfully seizing the home and personality of the Plaintiff; and

25.    As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANT’S conduct, Plaintiff sustained the following damages:

a.)    The value of the remainder of the lease and the damages articulated herein; and

b.)    The value of all lost personality stolen by the Vendor before and after the Sheriff Sale of the property at public auction to US BANK/BANCORP; and

c.)    The loss of felines intentionally locked inside and suffering abuse at the negligence of the Vendor so advised of the remaining cats inside as identified by specific description and age and sex; and

d.)    The value of out of pocket expenses; and

e.)    past and future mental anguish and extreme emotional distress; and

f.)    nominal expenses and damages; and

g.)    court costs and expenses to prosecute this case; and

h.)   pre-judgement interest; and

(i)    post-judgement interest; and

i.)    attorney fees.

TRESPASS -
ALL DEFENDANTS
 
26.    A Claimant may recover from a defendant on an action for trespass upon establishing the following elements: (a) the Claimant owned or had a lawful right to possess real property; (b) the defendant entered the Claimant’s land physically, intentionally, and voluntarily; and (c) the trespass caused injury to the Claimant or the Claimant’s injury is presumed.
 
27.    Here, Plaintiff had a lawful right to possess the real property, under the common address of 526 East Jackson Street, since October of 2009 as occupied then and later as when the lockout occurred and DEFENDANTS: Chad Jones and others unknown, including the police entered into the house and home of the Plaintiff/Tenant without permission of the Plaintiff/Tenant. Said Defendants entered Plaintiff’s rented property under lease with the owner Landlord Greg Needler for an unlawful purpose – namely, if no lawful foreclosure had taken place and or if no notices to vacate or other notices to attend a court hearing had been delivered to the Plaintiff, the All Defendants in this Action/Suit, on their own or through their Agents or as accomplices at arms length in an advisory capacity, unlawfully entered the land and did unlawfully also enter into the house and garage on the property rented to the Plaintiff/Tenant and took possession of the real property and all personality remaining as deprived of the Plaintiff/Tenant by such Defendants. Under Indiana Law, a party who enters – or requests, or intentionally causes, a third-party to enter another’s land – is liable for the trespass and its consequences (including those caused by a third party). Here, Defendant’s conduct, of their own or through one or more agents, caused injury to the Plaintiff/Tenant, including without limitation: the loss of home and personality and the loss of eight feline pets, including the death of a runt kitten that did not survive the torture and negligent abuse of being locked inside the house for 8 days without water and food, all of which is the intentional infliction, with malice of forethought and fraud in the misinformation and oppression an injury of extreme mental anguish and extreme emotional distress, such as anyone without a doubt would experience under similar or like event and actions of the DEFENDANTS.
 
28.    As a result, the Plaintiff is hereby entitled to and has a lawful and legitimate right to seek the following damages:

(a) the damages articulated herein for each offense resulting in the mental anguish and emotional distress;and

(b) the value of the remaining lease period; and

(c) the value of all loss of personality stolen under pretense and with the aiding and abetting of the police and MATTHEW RENTSCHLER, as an attorney and legal counsel to the police, advising the police to arrest Plaintiff/Tenant.

 
29.    Further, the Plaintiff seeks exemplary damages because DEFENDANTS committed the foregoing offenses with malice of forethought and or oppression under the guise of Fraud and or misinformation provided to police.
 
NEGLIGENCE/GROSS NEGLIGENCE
ALL DEFENDANTS

30.    Further, Plaintiff would show that:

(a) DEFENDANTS’ intended Plaintiff to no longer enjoy possession of the Plaintiff home at 526 East Jackson Street, Columbia City, Indiana 46725; and

(b) DEFENDANTS, on their own or through one or more agents and or accomplices, engaged in acts or omissions that substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s/Tenant’s use and enjoyment of the house and real estate occupied by the Plaintiff/Tenant as home and shelter – namely by seizing the home and evicting the Plaintiff/Tenant without notice(s) as required by Law of the United States and the State of Indiana or any due process whatsoever; and/or failing to prevent the lockout and wrongful eviction;and

(c) so the Plaintiff/Tenant has permanently lost use and enjoyment and/or suffered criminal acts and/or loss of all personality and pet felines, with the house posted as being under the ownership and control of US BANK/BANCORP at least five months before such unlawful ownership occurred by means of Sheriff Sale, although US BANK/BANCORP most likely was without standing to obtain the decree of foreclosure and judgment; and

(d) Plaintiff had no choice under duress of force of arms of police assisting in the illegalities of the lockout and wrongful eviction, but to abandon the house and home of the Plaintiff/Tenant and all remaining personality and pet felines as a result of DEFENDANTS’ acts and omissions, when there was a duty not to so violate the rights of the Plaintiff/Tenant.

31.    DEFENDANTS’ conduct, as described above, proximately caused injury to Plaintiff, including, but not limited to:

(a) death of a runt kitten and loss of the other seven felines locked inside the house and loss of the other six felines confiscated by the animal shelter which the police called to assist and aid and abet the DEFENDANTS unlawful offenses;

(b) the loss of the house as shelter and home for the Plaintiff/Tenant and felines;

(c) the value of the remainder of the leasehold;

(d) extra ordinary out of pocket expenses and nominal damages; and

(e) past and future extreme mental anguish and extreme emotion distress damages.

(f) Plaintiff further seeks pre-judgement interest; and

(g) post-judgement interest; and

(h) court costs and expenses of prosecution of the case; and

(i) attorney fees.

32.    Further, Plaintiff also seeks exemplary damages if greater than actual and compensatory damages awarded by the Jury as provided by Authority of IC 34-24-3-3, et seq. and Plaintiff would show that DEFENDANTS acted with reckless disregard and/or with malice of forethought while committing Fraud by misinformation and committing oppression of the rights of the Plaintiff//Tenant.

33.    Further, Plaintiff also seeks, as a neglected and denied party of interest in the foreclosure, to have the court vacate the decree of foreclosure for lack of standing by US BANK/BANCORP; and

34.    Further, Plaintiff also seeks, in the alternative, damages for the conversion of personality stolen by the DEFENDANTS and or those at arms length and or present and aiding and abetting the offense and all other damages as provided by Authority of IC 34-24-3-3, et seq..

VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND JOINT LIABILITY -
ALL DEFENDANTS

35.    Plaintiff would show that US BANK/BANCORP and FIVE BROTHERS MORTGAGE SERVICES AND SERVICING, INC. and MATTHEW RENTSCHLER did conduct acts/or omissions complained herein committed in gross neglect of Law of PTFA; and Plaintiff suffered injury of:

(a) economic damages;

(b) including the market value of leasehold

(c) past and future extreme mental anguish and extreme emotional distress;

(d) Plaintiff seeks pre-judgement interest; and

(e) post-judgement interest;

(f) court costs; and

(g) attorney fees.

 

36.    Further Plaintiff would show that above said DEFENDANTS engaged in the described behavior, knowingly and intentionally and therefore the Plaintiff seeks exemplary treble damages as punitive judgment by Jury, for the conduct constituting malice of forethought as committed under Fraud by misinformation to the police, to accomplish the oppression of the Plaintiff/Tenant, deprived of due process and other rights by Federal Law of the United States and State Law of Indiana.

PRINCIPLE/AGENT LIABILITY
All Defendants excepting Chad Jones

37.    Plaintiff would show that each of the DEFENDANTS intentionally conferred authority upon the other DEFENDANTS to act as agent(s), and/or affirmatively

38.    Plaintiff would show that the DEFENDANTS are jointly and severally liable for each other and/or that each DEFENDANT is vicariously liable for the acts of one or more of the other DEFENDANTS, under the following theories:

39.    Further, Plaintiff seeks exemplary damages because DEFENDANTS committed the foregoing with willfulness, reckless disregard, and/or malice of forethought, constituting gross negligence.
 
 
 
40.    INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF SEVERE OR EXTREME MENTAL ANGUISH AND SEVERE OR EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
ALL DEFENDANTS
 
41.    Plaintiff is a natural person. As set forth herein, DEFENDANTS acted intentionally and reckless with regard to Plaintiff/Tenant in the seizure of the house by means of lockout and self help measure to wrongfully evict the Plaintiff/Tenant without any due process whatsoever. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANTS’ conduct, Plaintiff/Tenant suffered severe or extreme emotional distress.
 
42.    Further, Plaintiff would show that DEFENDANTS conduct resulting in the illegal lockout and wrongful eviction of the Plaintiff/Tenant was extreme and outrageous. And no alternate cause of action would provide an adequate remedy for the severe or extreme emotional distress caused by the DEFENDANTS’ conduct.
 
43.    In consequence of DEFENDANTS’ conduct of malice aforethought and Fraud by misinformation to police and oppression as inflicted against the Plaintiff/Tenant, Plaintiff seeks the following damages;

(a) past and future mental anguish,

(b) past and future loss of society,

(c) and past and future court costs,

(d) past and future expenses, including attorney expenses and expense of travel to make court appearances.

 
(e) Plaintiff seeks exemplary damages;

(f) pre-judgement; and

(g) post-judgement interest; and

(h) court costs; and

(i) attorney fees.


 
         
 
 

Information Maintained by the Office of Code Revision Indiana Legislative Services Agency
IC 32-31-4
     Chapter 4. Moving and Storage of Tenant’s Property

IC 32-31-4-1
“Exempt property” defined
    
Sec. 1. As used in this chapter, “exempt property” means personal property that is any of the following:
        (1) Medically necessary for an individual.
        (2) Used by a tenant for the tenant’s trade or business.
        (3) Any of the following, as necessary for the tenant or a member of the tenant’s household:
            (A) A week’s supply of seasonably necessary clothing.
            (B) Blankets.
            (C) Items necessary for the care and schooling of a minor child.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-4-1.5
“Storage facility” defined
    
Sec. 1.5. As used in this chapter, “storage facility” means any location approved by a court for storage of a tenant’s personal property under section 2(e) of this chapter.
As added by P.L.115-2007, SEC.1.
IC 32-31-4-2
Liability; abandoned property; court order allowing removal by landlord
    
Sec. 2. (a) A landlord has no liability for loss or damage to a tenant’s personal property if the tenant’s personal property has been abandoned by the tenant.
    (b) For purposes of this section, a tenant’s personal property is considered abandoned if a reasonable person would conclude that the tenant has vacated the premises and has surrendered possession of the personal property.
    (c) An oral or a written rental agreement may not define abandonment differently than is provided in subsection (b).
    (d) If a landlord is awarded possession of a dwelling unit by a court under IC 32-30-2, the landlord may seek an order from the court allowing removal of a tenant’s personal property.
    (e) If the tenant fails to remove the tenant’s personal property before the date specified in the court’s order issued under subsection (d), the landlord may remove the tenant’s personal property in accordance with the order and deliver the personal property to a warehouseman under section 3 of this chapter or to a storage facility approved by the court.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16. Amended by P.L.115-2007, SEC.2.
IC 32-31-4-3
Delivery to warehouseman or storage facility after notice to tenant; release of exempt property

     Sec. 3. (a) If a tenant has failed to remove the tenant’s personal property under section 2 of this chapter, a landlord may deliver the personal property to a warehouseman or to a storage facility if notice of both of the following has been personally served on the tenant at the last known address of the tenant:
        (1) An order for removal of personal property issued under section 2 of this chapter.
        (2) The identity and location of the warehouseman or the storage facility.
    (b) At the demand of the owner of the exempt property, the warehouseman or storage facility shall release the exempt property to the owner without requiring payment from the owner at the time of delivery.
    (c) A waiver of the provisions of section 1 of this chapter or subsection (b) by contract or otherwise is void.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16. Amended by P.L.115-2007, SEC.3.
IC 32-31-4-4
Lien on nonexempt property for expenses incurred by warehouseman or storage facility
    
Sec. 4. (a) A warehouseman or storage facility that receives property under this chapter holds a lien on all of that property that is not exempt property to the extent of the expenses for any of the following incurred by the warehouseman or storage facility with respect to all of the property, whether exempt or not exempt:
        (1) Storage.
        (2) Transportation.
        (3) Insurance.
        (4) Labor.
        (5) Present or future charges related to the property.
        (6) Expenses necessary for preservation of the property.
        (7) Expenses reasonably incurred in the lawful sale of the property.
    (b) A tenant may claim the tenant’s property at any time until the sale of the property under section 5 of this chapter by paying the warehouseman or storage facility the expenses described in this section.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16. Amended by P.L.115-2007, SEC.4.

IC 32-31-4-5
Sale of unclaimed property
    
Sec. 5. If a tenant does not claim the tenant’s property within ninety (90) days after receiving notice under section 3 of this chapter, a warehouseman or storage facility may sell the property received under this chapter under IC 26-1-7-210(b).
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16. Amended by P.L.143-2007, SEC.77; P.L.115-2007, SEC.5.
 
Information Maintained by the Office of Code Revision Indiana Legislative Services Agency
IC 32-31-5
     Chapter 5. Rental Agreements; Right of Access

IC 32-31-5-1
Applicability of chapter
    
Sec. 1. (a) This chapter applies only to a rental agreement entered into or renewed after June 30, 1999.
    (b) This chapter applies to a landlord or tenant only if the rental agreement was entered into or renewed after June 30, 1999.
    (c) A waiver of this chapter by a landlord or tenant, including a former tenant, by contract or otherwise, is void.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-5-2
Applicability of definitions
    
Sec. 2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the definitions in IC 32-31-3 apply throughout this chapter.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-5-3
“Dwelling unit” defined
    
Sec. 3. (a) As used in this chapter, “dwelling unit” means a structure or part of a structure that is used as a home, residence, or sleeping unit.
    (b) The term includes the following:
        (1) An apartment unit.
        (2) A boarding house unit.
        (3) A rooming house unit.
        (4) A manufactured home (as defined in IC 22-12-1-16) or mobile structure (as defined in IC 22-12-1-17) and the space occupied by the manufactured home or mobile structure.
        (5) A single or two (2) family dwelling.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-5-4
Written notice required to modify rental agreement
    
Sec. 4. Unless otherwise provided by a written rental agreement between a landlord and tenant, a landlord shall give the tenant at least thirty (30) days written notice before modifying the rental agreement.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.

IC 32-31-5-5
Tenant’s personal property
    
Sec. 5. (a) Except as provided in IC 16-41-27-29, IC 32-31-3, or IC 32-31-4, a landlord may not:
        (1) take possession of;
        (2) remove from a tenant’s dwelling unit;
        (3) deny a tenant access to; or
        (4) dispose of;

a tenant’s personal property in order to enforce an obligation of the tenant to the landlord under a rental agreement.
    (b) The landlord and tenant may agree in a writing separate from the rental agreement that the landlord may hold property voluntarily tendered by the tenant as security in exchange for forbearance from an action to evict.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-5-6
Landlord prohibited from interfering with access, possession, or essential services; unit entry by landlord
    
Sec. 6. (a) This section does not apply if the dwelling unit has been abandoned.
    (b) For purposes of this section, a dwelling unit is considered abandoned if:
        (1) the tenants have failed to:
            (A) pay; or
            (B) offer to pay;
        rent due under the rental agreement; and
        (2) the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would conclude that the tenants have surrendered possession of the dwelling unit.
An oral or written rental agreement may not define abandonment differently than is provided by this subsection.
    (c) Except as authorized by judicial order, a landlord may not deny or interfere with a tenant’s access to or possession of the tenant’s dwelling unit by commission of any act, including the following:
        (1) Changing the locks or adding a device to exclude the tenant from the dwelling unit.
        (2) Removing the doors, windows, fixtures, or appliances from the dwelling unit.
        (3) Interrupting, reducing, shutting off, or causing termination of any of the following to a tenant:
            (A) Electricity.
            (B) Gas.
            (C) Water.
            (D) Other essential services.
        However, the landlord may interrupt, shut off, or terminate service as the result of an emergency, good faith repairs, or necessary construction. This subdivision does not require a landlord to pay for services described in this subdivision if the landlord has not agreed, by an oral or written rental agreement, to do so.
    (d) A tenant may not interrupt, reduce, shut off, or cause termination of:
        (1) electricity;
        (2) gas;
        (3) water; or
        (4) other essential services;

to the dwelling unit if the interruption, reduction, shutting off, or termination of the service will result in serious damage to the rental unit.
    (e) A tenant may not unreasonably withhold consent to the tenant’s landlord to enter the tenant’s dwelling unit in order to:
        (1) inspect the dwelling unit;
        (2) make necessary or agreed to:
            (A) repairs;
            (B) decorations;
            (C) alterations; or
            (D) improvements;
        (3) supply necessary or agreed to services; or
        (4) exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual:
            (A) purchasers;
            (B) mortgagees;
            (C) tenants;
            (D) workers; or
            (E) contractors.
    (f) A landlord may enter the dwelling unit:
        (1) without notice to the tenant in the case of an emergency that threatens the safety of the occupants or the landlord’s property; and
        (2) without the consent of the tenant:
            (A) under a court order; or
            (B) if the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the dwelling unit.
    (g) A landlord:
        (1) shall not abuse the right of entry or use a right of entry to harass a tenant;
        (2) shall give a tenant reasonable written or oral notice of the landlord’s intent to enter the dwelling unit; and
        (3) may enter a tenant’s dwelling unit only at reasonable times.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16. Amended by P.L.115-2007, SEC.6.
IC 32-31-5-7
Written acknowledgement by tenant
    
Sec. 7. (a) At the time a landlord delivers a rental unit to a tenant, the landlord shall require the tenant to acknowledge in writing that the rental unit is equipped with a functional smoke detector.
    (b) A landlord and a tenant may not waive, in a rental agreement or a separate writing, the requirements under IC 22-11-18-3.5 concerning smoke detectors.
As added by P.L.17-2008, SEC.4.

Information Maintained by the Office of Code Revision Indiana Legislative Services Agency
IC 32-31-6
     Chapter 6. Emergency Possessory Orders

IC 32-31-6-1
Applicability of definitions
    
Sec. 1. The definitions in IC 32-31-3 and IC 32-31-5 apply throughout this chapter.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-6-2
Small claims jurisdiction
    
Sec. 2. The small claims docket of a court has jurisdiction to grant an emergency possessory order under this chapter.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-6-3
Eligibility to file petition
    
Sec. 3. The following may file a petition for an emergency possessory order under this chapter:
        (1) A tenant, if the landlord has violated IC 32-31-5-6.
        (2) A landlord, if the tenant has committed or threatens to commit waste to the rental unit.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-6-4
Petition requirements
    
Sec. 4. A petition for an order under this chapter must:
        (1) include an allegation specifying:
            (A) the violation, act, or omission caused or threatened by a landlord or tenant; and
            (B) The nature of the specific immediate and serious:
                (i) injury;
                (ii) loss; or
                (iii) damage;
            that the landlord or tenant has suffered or will suffer if the violation, act, or omission is not enjoined; and
        (2) be sworn to by the petitioner.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-6-5
Court review; emergency hearing
    
Sec. 5. If a tenant or a landlord petitions the court to issue an order under this chapter, the court shall immediately do the following:
        (1) Review the petition.
        (2) Schedule an emergency hearing for not later than three (3) business days after the petition is filed.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-6-6

Emergency order
    
Sec. 6. (a) At the emergency hearing, if the court finds:
        (1) probable cause to believe that the landlord has violated or threatened to violate IC 32-31-5-6; and
        (2) that the tenant will suffer immediate and serious injury, loss, or damage;
the court shall issue an emergency order under subsection (b).
    (b) If the court makes a finding under subsection (a), the court shall order the landlord to do either or both of the following:
        (1) Return possession of the dwelling unit to the tenant if the tenant has been deprived of possession of the dwelling unit.
        (2) Refrain from violating IC 32-31-5-6.
    (c) The court may make other orders that the court considers just under the circumstances, including setting a subsequent hearing at the request of a party to adjudicate related claims between the parties.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-6-7
Waste
    
Sec. 7. (a) As used in this section, “waste” does not include failure to pay rent.
    (b) At the emergency hearing, if the court finds:
        (1) probable cause to believe that the tenant has committed or threatens to commit waste to the rental unit; and
        (2) that the landlord has suffered or will suffer immediate and serious:
            (A) injury;
            (B) loss; or
            (C) damage;
the court shall issue an order under subsection (c).
    (c) If the court makes a finding under subsection (b), the court shall order the tenant to do either or both of the following:
        (1) Return possession of the dwelling unit to the landlord.
        (2) Refrain from committing waste to the dwelling unit.
    (d) The court may make other orders that the court considers just under the circumstances, including setting a subsequent hearing at the request of a party to adjudicate related claims between the parties.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-6-8
Summons; court procedure
    
Sec. 8. (a) If a petition is filed under this chapter, the clerk shall issue to the respondent a summons to appear at a hearing. The summons must:
        (1) give notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing; and
        (2) inform the respondent that the respondent must appear before the court to answer the petition.
    (b) The clerk shall serve the respondent with the summons to
appear in accordance with Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Trial Procedure.
    (c) The court shall not grant a continuance of the emergency hearing except upon clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice would result if a continuance were not granted.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-6-9
Subsequent hearing
    
Sec. 9. If the court sets a subsequent hearing under section 6(c) or 7(d) of this chapter, the court may do the following at the subsequent hearing:
        (1) Determine damages.
        (2) Order return of a tenant’s withheld property.
        (3) Make other orders the court considers just under the circumstances.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.
IC 32-31-6-10
Other claims
    
Sec. 10. The adjudication of an emergency possessory claim under section 6(b) or 7(c) of this chapter does not bar a subsequent claim a party may have against the other party arising out of the landlord and tenant relationship unless that claim has been adjudicated under section 9 of this chapter.
As added by P.L.2-2002, SEC.16.

Information Maintained by the Office of Code Revision Indiana Legislative Services Agency
IC 32-31-8
     Chapter 8. Landlord Obligations Under a Rental Agreement

IC 32-31-8-1
Application
    
Sec. 1. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), this chapter applies only to dwelling units that are let for rent under a rental agreement entered into after June 30, 2002.
    (b) This chapter does not apply to dwelling units that are let for rent with an option to purchase under an agreement entered into before July 1, 2008.
As added by P.L.92-2002, SEC.2. Amended by P.L.62-2008, SEC.4.
IC 32-31-8-2
Applicability of definitions
    
Sec. 2. The definitions in IC 32-31-3 apply throughout this chapter.
As added by P.L.92-2002, SEC.2.
IC 32-31-8-3
“Rental premises” defined
    
Sec. 3. As used in this chapter, “rental premises” includes all of the following:
        (1) A tenant’s rental unit.
        (2) The structure in which the tenant’s rental unit is a part.
As added by P.L.92-2002, SEC.2.
IC 32-31-8-4
Effect of waiver of statute
    
Sec. 4. A waiver of the application of this chapter by a landlord or tenant, by contract or otherwise, is void.
As added by P.L.92-2002, SEC.2.
IC 32-31-8-5
Landlord obligations
    
Sec. 5. A landlord shall do the following:
        (1) Deliver the rental premises to a tenant in compliance with the rental agreement, and in a safe, clean, and habitable condition.
        (2) Comply with all health and housing codes applicable to the rental premises.
        (3) Make all reasonable efforts to keep common areas of a rental premises in a clean and proper condition.
        (4) Provide and maintain the following items in a rental premises in good and safe working condition, if provided on the premises at the time the rental agreement is entered into:
            (A) Electrical systems.
            (B) Plumbing systems sufficient to accommodate a reasonable supply of hot and cold running water at all times.
            (C) Sanitary systems.

            (D) Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems. A heating system must be sufficient to adequately supply heat at all times.
            (E) Elevators, if provided.
            (F) Appliances supplied as an inducement to the rental agreement.
As added by P.L.92-2002, SEC.2.
IC 32-31-8-6
Tenant’s cause of action to enforce landlord obligations
    
Sec. 6. (a) A tenant may bring an action in a court with jurisdiction to enforce an obligation of a landlord under this chapter.
    (b) A tenant may not bring an action under this chapter unless the following conditions are met:
        (1) The tenant gives the landlord notice of the landlord’s noncompliance with a provision of this chapter.
        (2) The landlord has been given a reasonable amount of time to make repairs or provide a remedy of the condition described in the tenant’s notice. The tenant may not prevent the landlord from having access to the rental premises to make repairs or provide a remedy to the condition described in the tenant’s notice.
        (3) The landlord fails or refuses to repair or remedy the condition described in the tenant’s notice.
    (c) This section may not be construed to limit a tenant’s rights under IC 32-31-3, IC 32-31-5, or IC 32-31-6.
    (d) If the tenant is the prevailing party in an action under this section, the tenant may obtain any of the following, if appropriate under the circumstances:
        (1) Recovery of the following:
            (A) Actual damages and consequential damages.
            (B) Attorney’s fees and court costs.
        (2) Injunctive relief.
        (3) Any other remedy appropriate under the circumstances.
    (e) A landlord’s liability for damages under subsection (d) begins when:
        (1) the landlord has notice or actual knowledge of noncompliance; and
        (2) the landlord has:
            (A) refused to remedy the noncompliance; or
            (B) failed to remedy the noncompliance within a reasonable amount of time following the notice or actual knowledge;
        whichever occurs first.
As added by P.L.92-2002, SEC.2.


DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Wherefore the Plaintiff Demands Jury Trial and for judgment of the damages as complained herein and all other relief at law and or equity for justice in the premises, along with pre-judgement interest and post-judgement interest and exemplary and or punitive damages, plus all court costs and expenses to prosecute this Case

 
 
 
 
Written Interrogatories to FIVE BROTHERS MORTGAGE SERVICES AND SERVICING, INC

1.    What is the name and address and phone number of each of the individuals contracted to do an occupancy verification inspection of 526 East Jackson Street, Columbia City, Indiana 46725 for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011, especially the female that came onto the property on September 29, 2010 at about 9AM and left a red tag door hanger at this location with Michael-Lynn goble, the Tenant then residing at the premises then owned by Greg Needler as Landlord?

2.    What written notice(s), if any, did you send to the Tenant: Michael-Lynn goble, prior to the vendors locking this Tenant out of the house at 526 East Jackson Street, Columbia City, Indiana 46725 and provide a copy or copies if more than one was delivered to this address to any unknown occupant?

3.   Who did you contact by phone or email on the date of September 29, 2010 and or September 30, 2010, concerning anything to do with the property location of 526 East Jackson Street, Columbia City, Indiana 46725, providing all details and any copies of hard copy records and or voice recordings, including the names and addresses and phone numbers of all such contacts?

4.    What contracts has this Defendant had with Michael D. Hollingsworth and or Chad Jones for 526 East Jackson Street, Columbia City, Indiana 467625 and please provide all information as relates to bonds of any kind and all such contracts and applications submitted by the above named and all payments made with complete descriptions of the work performed with dates and hours inclusive prior to the decree of foreclosure dated September 30, 2010 and subsequently thereafter until this property was sold and or title transferred by US BANK/BANCORP to FHA after the Sheriff sale?

5.    In as much as the Vendor: Michael D. Hollingsworth and employee: Chad Jones (and perhaps other employees) of said Vendor each live close to each other, as neighbors just outside Parker City, Indiana and about 3 hours round trip drive or about 100 distance one way, how much would Five Brothers have paid to this Vendor to compensate this Vendor on the date of the lockout on September 29, 2010, had said Vendor, upon observing that the property was occupied by this Plaintiff, have ceased and quit performing the property preservation under contract with Five Brothers and if no compensation would have been forthcoming from Five Brothers to cover such costs and expenses of the Vendor, because this Vendor would not have been at all compensated by Five Brothers for all the fuel and maintenance costs for equipment and expenses for hourly employees then on location, would such lack of compensation by Five Brothers seemingly be motivation for that Vendor, to misinform not only the police, but also Five Brothers so this Vendor would for lack of compensation be very motivated to not quit without pay for the job and would proceed anyway to do the change of locks and disconnect the utilities billed in the name of this Plaintiff in disregard of the apparent occupation of the property by this Plaintiff as Tenant and please provide proof of compensation with itemization of what the Vendor was paid for if at all compensated for this trip to the property on this date ?

Request for Admissions

1.    I, Admit, deny or object that before or prior to and also on and after the date of September 29, 2010 and until the date of the sheriff auction held about five months thereafter said date, that US BANK/BANCORP only had a mere security interest in 526 East Jackson Street, Columbia City, Indiana 46725 and was never the owner of said property location until after acquiring the sheriff deed after the auction.

2.    I, Admit, deny or object, that in accordance with the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (PTFA), all subsequent owners of a property acquired out of foreclosure as buyer of such property, unless it is to be owner occupied by the purchaser at the sheriff sale, purchases the property subject to any tenancy and or lease as then occupied and steps into the shoes of the prior landlord to become the new landlord as new owner of the property purchased at such sale of a foreclosed property.

3.    I, Admit, deny or object, that prior to the date of September 29, 2010 that I did have knowledge of PTFA, having received notices by regular mail and or email or phone advising of the provisions of PTFA, if not from any Attorney General of any State in the United States, then otherwise, as I now provide copies of all such notices herewith this answer from whatever source.

4.    I Admit, deny or object that I contracted Michael D. Hollingsworth to do a property preservation service of the property that is 526 East Jackson Street, Columbia City, Indiana 46725, and include copies of all contracts and applications submitted and or signed by or bearing the name of this individual that lives near Chad Jones as both live near E. Jackson Street, near Muncie, Indiana.

5.    I Admit, deny or object that DEFENDANT US BANK/BANCORP never served any notice to the Plaintiff/Tenant in the Foreclosure Case for due process for Plaintiff/Tenant to timely heard by appearance therein.

6.    I Admit, deny or object that DEFENDANT US BANK/BANCORP disregarded IC 32-31 _____ and never delivered any written notice whatsoever to the Plaintiff/Tenant.

 

 
 
 
 
 
 

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